sat well with the liberal philosophy of the time, but was gradually undermined by the growing rigidity of product and labour markets, which meant that the unemployment costs of deflation rose, and by the extension of the franchise which meant that the political costs rose as well (Eichengreen 1992) .
During the interwar period, the gold standard transmitted the contractionary impulses emanating from the United States worldwide, and made it impossible to combat the incipient Depression. The result was that one after the other, countries switched to prioritizing domestic policies, abandoning exchange rate pegs, open capital markets, or both. After the interwar disaster, a new regime was instituted at Bretton Woods, which prioritised domestic monetary policy autonomy and fixed exchange rates (since competitive devaluations were felt to have been a serious problem in the 1930s). The result was capital controls, which persisted for many years, but were eventually undermined by the markets. In 1973 fixed exchange rates were abandoned, and the world entered the era of capital mobility and floating rates which persists to this day. While capital mobility has proved troublesome on many occasionsespecially when market participants have persuaded themselves that they did not need to concern themselves with exchange rate risk -there is no doubt that the floating rate environment was one reason why the policy response to the crisis of 2008--9 was so much more successful than the policy response of 1929--32 (Eichengreen and O'Rourke 2009, Almunia et al. 2010) . Within Europe, the move to floating was seen as a serious challenge because of the threat which sharp exchange rate movements might pose to the Common (and later Single) Market, and for technical reasons having to do, for example, with green exchange rates. Attempts to limit exchange rate fluctuations soon got underway, culminating in the creation of the EMS in 1979. Initially the system functioned fairly well, due to residual capital controls, and frequent exchange rate realignments. However, after 1987 the system became far more rigid, while capital controls were abolished as a result of the Single Market programme. In retrospect the collapse of 1992--93 can be seen as inevitable, since there was a limit to the extent to which national governments were prepared to subordinate national monetary policy to the requirements of a fixed exchange rate regime. The prior decision by a subset of EC members to move to EMU was another logical response to the challenges posed by the trilemma, in the context of capital mobility. Market doubts about the viability of a fixed exchange rate system in such an environment meant that in the long run the abandonment of separate currencies was a more stable solution. European Monetary Union has thus solved the economic trilemma in a particularly radical way: capital mobility combined with the complete abandonment of national monetary sovereignty.
The political trilemma and EMU
There is another way to tell the same story, which relies on another trilemma, which is political, and which has been developed by Dani Rodrik in a series of articles and his most recent book (Rodrik 2000 (Rodrik , 2011 . This "fundamental political trilemma of the world economy" argues that "we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination, and economic globalization. If we want to push globalization further, we have to give up the nation state or democratic politics. If we want to maintain and deepen democracy, we have to chose between the nation state and international economic integration. And if we want to keep the nation state and self--determination, we have to chose between deepening democracy and deepening globalization" (Rodrik 2011, pp. xviii--xix) . The argument is that "deep globalization" involves a commitment to not just open commodity and capital markets, with the constraints that these imply, but also to a competition for mobile factors of production that makes it difficult for national governments to adopt regulatory standards or other interventionist policies, even when their populations want this. The solutions are either to allow popular opinion to manifest itself through supra--national mechanisms, or to ignore it. On this reading of history, the pre--1914 gold standard could be sustained, despite the deflationary policies which it imposed on deficit countries, because of the limited franchise of the period: the system was based on nation states and globalization, because democracy was not much of a constraint. With the extension of the franchise, commitment to the gold standard -which was seen in those days as synonymous with commitment to the international economy - and banking regulation; and it has occurred without a move towards a common fiscal policy, which most economists also regard as a desirable complement to a common monetary policy. To see why this piecemeal and risky approach was adopted, it is necessary to take a closer look at the political economy of the European Union more generally, and again the political trilemma provides a useful lens through which to view this. disillusionment had led them to support extremist parties during the interwar period in many countries, workers, and those dependent on the welfare state.
The solution was to provide workers with rising wages and full employment, to ensure rising living standards for the agricultural sector, and to establish modern welfare states. Accomplishing all three goals required an extension of government intervention in the economy. The welfare state reduced economic insecurity, while Keynesian macroeconomic policies helped stabilise economic fluctuations.
As regards agriculture, after World War II all European countries experienced severe food shortages, at a time when governments wished to achieve food self--sufficiency for strategic reasons. The result was widespread agricultural intervention across Europe. For all these reasons, as Milward says, "in the long run of history there has surely never been a period when national government in Europe has exercised more effective power and more extensive control over its citizens than that since the Second World War, nor one in which its ambitions expanded so rapidly. Its laws, officials, policemen, spies, statisticians, revenue collectors, and social workers have penetrated into a far wider range of human activities than they were earlier able or encouraged to do". were concerned that their car manufacturers and other industries would suffer from the fact that French law provided workers with longer paid holidays than elsewhere; that it required (in principle) equal pay for men and women, whereas in other countries women's earnings were roughly a third lower than men's; and that it set a working week in France of only 40 hours, as opposed to 48 hours in Germany and Belgium (implying that high overtime rates accounted for a higher share of weekly pay in France). A particular concern for French industry was that social security costs were lower in Germany, where wages were also lower. It was politically essential that the domestic social welfare systems which not only underpinned governments' political legitimacy, but their economic growth strategies as well, not be undermined by the development of Europe--wide free trade. As Milward puts it, "The problem genuinely was how to construct a commercial framework which would not endanger the levels of social welfare which had been reached…The Treaties of Rome had to be also an external buttress to the welfare state." 3 A logical response was to argue, as the Delegating policy decisions to technocrats may make a lot of sense economically, since rules are often superior to discretion, but democratic politics in national jurisdictions typically involves more than a series of decisions to replace political discretion with binding rules, and there are political risks in allowing European politics to become defined in this way. The alternative is to allow policies to be determined on an ongoing basis by elected politicians, either using intergovernmental means (which runs into the problems outlined above) or more fully--fledged 'federal' procedures. Europe is currently stuck somewhere between these two modes of governance, with the Lisbon Treaty having shifted the equilibrium modestly in the direction of a more 'federal' system.
Public opinion before and after the crisis
The current crisis has demonstrated the need for a common European approach to banking regulation and resolution. This is the major reform that EMU needs if further crises are to be avoided, although there is no doubt that a centralised budget which could help smooth asymmetric shocks would also be helpful. Will the current crisis lead to integration moving forward along these lines, or will it lead to greater reliance on national policies, and maybe even to an unravelling of EMU? Public opinion will ultimately be crucial here, and so it is worth digressing briefly to discuss popular attitudes towards the EU in general, and EMU in particular. The first point to note is that the Euro project started with less public started out with negative net ratings in Germany, its most important member, and this imposes constraints on what the German government is able to do to maintain Eurozone stability. In particular, it is hard to see any real progress towards anything approaching a fiscal union. One somewhat self--serving interpretation of these findings is that the less well--educated are more anti--EU because they are not sufficiently well informed about the benefits of the European project. Another interpretation, which is not necessarily incompatible with the first, is that these class differences reflect different interests, real or perceived. In particular, the unskilled in rich countries, and the less mobile everywhere, may have less to gain from international economic integration than the skilled or the mobile -whether this integration takes the form of Polish plumbers, délocalisation, or trade. On this reading, attitudes towards European integration reflect broader concerns about globalization in rich countries (Mayda 2006 , Mayda and Rodrik 2005 , O'Rourke and Sinnott 2001 , 2006 . Attitudes towards EMU might also be expected to reflect other economic preferences, regarding unemployment and inflation for example. Given the inflation--fighting mandate of the ECB, one might expect to see less support for EMU among the unemployed, and more support among groups which like low inflation, such as pensioners. This is in fact what the data indicate: Table 1 gives the results of a preliminary multivariate probit analysis of attitudes in the Eurozone towards globalization, the European Union in general, and European
Monetary Union, allowing for the possibility that these attitudes may all be correlated with each other. 4 The results show that support for EMU is positively correlated with support for both globalization and the EU, and that it is higher among the better educated, white collar workers, and retirees. On the other hand, it is lower among the unemployed, and those who consider themselves to be on the right politically. 5 Interestingly, pensioners are not significantly more likely to favour EMU in Germany, but are very significantly more likely to do so in France. 6 Table 1 . Attitudes towards globalization, the EU and EMU (multivariate probit analysis) Source: author's estimates, based on European Commission (Eurobarometer) data.
Third, attitudes towards the European Union have become more negative during the current crisis (Figure 3 ). Respondents are less likely to report that EU membership is a good thing, for example. Ireland has for a long time been one of the most Europhile countries in Europe (by a happy coincidence, it is also the one country whose Constitution obliges it to hold referenda on all major unemployed, retirees, and those still in education. The latter is the excluded category in the regressions. 6 Regressions available on request.
European treaties), and its voters are still overwhelmingly likely to view EU membership in a positive light (Sinnott and McBride 2011 
After the crisis: stuck between trilemmas
In many ways the economic crisis of 2008--9 offered the European Union with a golden opportunity to make itself more relevant to the public. There is strong popular support for Europe--wide initiatives to regulate banks and bankers. More broadly, with old growth models based on global imbalances, debt, and private or public consumption running into difficulty, the opportunity to develop alternative strategies based on investment -inter alia in energy and transportation infrastructures, which will be required going forward anywayseemed obvious. Such a strategy would, in the European context, surely be largely cross--border in nature.
What we have seen instead is a series of ineffectual moves on financial regulation, and now a complete unwillingness to confront the European banking crisis head--on. Rather than promoting pan--European growth strategies, the institutions of the Union have been enthusiastically promoting pro--cyclical fiscal adjustments in the periphery, even as they insist that heavily indebted governments repay private creditors of private banks in full. Not only is the policy incoherent, making sovereign default more likely on the one hand, while preaching austerity on the other; the insistence that taxpayers rather than investors pay for bank losses is also setting the stage for a potentially very damaging confrontation between core and periphery taxpayers. The political consequences of this are unknowable, but in Ireland, just three months after the troika's intervention, the political party that had been dominant since the 1930s was annihilated at the polls, with the radical and Eurosceptic Sinn Féin now sniffing at its heels: and this in one of the most conservative, and Europhile, countries in Europe. What three or four years of the current policy mix will do is anybody's guess. At one level, this can be regarded as a damning indictment of Europe's political leadership. At another level, the political trilemma suggests that it can be seen as proof of the primacy of politics, the problem being that it is national politics which are currently dominant, and that are making an effective common response impossible. If the nation state remains dominant within the Eurozone, then the trilemma suggests that there are two logical possibilities. Either public opinion is successfully ignored in countries like Germany, Greece and Ireland; or
European Monetary Union will come under threat in the longer run. Something has got to give.
